



**FORUM:** Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee  
(SOCHUM)

**AGENDA:** Protecting Minority Rights in Myanmar After the  
Rohingya Crisis

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## **Esteemed Delegates and Honorable Advisors,**

It is my utmost honor and immense pleasure to welcome every single one of you to TTMUN'26.

Ever since its first session in 2015, TTMUN Conferences have been an undeniable portrayal of unity, collaboration, and resilience by the fellow members of the TTMUN Club. As the executive team of TTMUN'26, we have dedicated countless hours to organize the 11th annual session of TTMUN; while doing so, we have maintained the same passion and dedication with every step we have taken to sustain the quality of TTMUN. That being said, as the Secretary-General of TTMUN'26, I would like to thank my fellow executive team members and our remarkable advisor, Vesile Acar, whose support made it possible to organize this conference and host you here at our school on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of April. Yet, beyond its tradition, TTMUN'26 is shaped by its purpose.

Our mission in TTMUN Club is to foster mutual growth in a collaborative environment where we are not only discussing real-world issues but also work towards solutions. Therefore, in correlation with our mission, we have chosen the theme of TTMUN'26 to be "Bridging Divides in Human Rights". The significance of the theme lies in the unfortunate irony of the persistence of human rights violations. Today, our world is witnessing and turning a blind eye to human rights violations that the United Nations was initially established to ensure that the world would never witness and do so again. Acknowledging this, we, the youth shall not only wait for our turn to come tomorrow but shape it today. Hence, as the executive team, we hope for a fruitful conference where everyone, regardless of their role, contributes to the debates, lobbying, and discussions, bearing the urgency of our global reality in mind.

As we embark on this journey, this mission will be in action over the course of three days as the delegates will have the opportunity to be active in one of nine committees of TTMUN'26 with fifteen diverse agenda items that seek to solve the serious issues that our world is facing. While doing so, let's embrace the unparalleled value of collaboration, respect, and empathy for a better future. Finally, I hope that you have an incomparable MUN experience and once again as the Secretary General, I wholeheartedly welcome everyone to the TTMUN'26.

“All my hope is in youth!”

—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Yours sincerely,

Derin Halatçı - Secretary General

## INTRODUCTION

The protection of minority rights in Myanmar has reached a critical juncture in the wake of the 2017 Rohingya genocide and the February 2021 military coup. These two shocks; mass atrocity in Rakhine and the collapse of Myanmar’s partial democratic transition, did not merely worsen an already difficult rights environment; they reconfigured the state’s relationship with ethnic identity, citizenship, and security into a militarized, high-frequency crisis in which minority communities are exposed to layered risks: discriminatory law, communal polarization, and the direct effects of armed conflict, including displacement and attacks on civilians.

For decades, Myanmar’s political landscape has been shaped by contestation between the Bamar-majority center and a set of ethnic nationalities with distinct histories, territories, and armed organizations. That contestation includes longstanding struggles over autonomy, federalism, language and cultural rights, and



control of resources, often mediated through ceasefires, militarized governance, and emergency powers rather than rights-based institutions. The post-coup era has intensified these dynamics: the military’s attempt to sustain rule through coercion has coincided with expanded resistance forces and shifting territorial control, producing a protection vacuum in which minorities frequently face both state violence and armed-group abuses, while humanitarian access contracts.

Within this wider pattern, the Rohingya crisis represents an extreme case that illuminates the structural limits of minority protection in Myanmar. Rohingya have been systematically excluded from full citizenship and political belonging through a combination of discriminatory nationality policy, documentation practices, and movement controls, conditions that are closely tied to the risk and reality of atrocity crimes. UN investigations have documented patterns of serious violations and abuses in Rakhine, and the international community has increasingly framed the 2016–2017 “clearance operations” through genocide and crimes-against-humanity analyses.

After the 2021 coup, minority rights protection also became inseparable from the macro-question of civilian protection in civil war conditions. UN reporting has described



continued airstrikes and other attacks affecting civilian infrastructure and displacement settings, while conflict in Rakhine since late 2023 has added a new displacement layer, including additional Rohingya flight to Bangladesh in 2024–2025 and renewed fears of forced recruitment and communal incitement. Under these conditions, minority rights cannot be

safeguarded by “identity recognition” alone; they require enforceable legal status, protection from violence, and meaningful participation—none of which can be sustained without structural reform and accountability mechanisms that change incentives for perpetrators and gatekeepers. (UNHCR)

## **DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS**

- **Taingyintha (National Races):** A state-recognized category of 135 ethnic groups considered "indigenous" to Myanmar because they were allegedly settled in the territory prior to the start of British colonial rule in 1823.
- **1982 Citizenship Law:** The primary legal instrument governing nationality in Myanmar, which created a tiered system (full, associate, and naturalized) and is widely criticized for institutionalizing discrimination against non-indigenous minorities.
- **Statelessness:** The condition of an individual who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law; millions in Myanmar, particularly the Rohingya, fall into this category. This is the foundational international legal definition used by UNHCR and states in statelessness determination and protection frameworks.
- **Tatmadaw:** The official name of the Myanmar military, which currently operates as the State Administration Council (SAC) following the 2021 coup.
- **Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs):** Non-state armed groups representing various ethnic minorities, such as the **Arakan Army (AA)** or the **Kachin Independence Army (KIA)**, many of whom seek federalism and autonomy.

- **Minority:** There is no single universally binding treaty definition of “minority,” but UN practice and guidance frequently cite the Capotorti definition: a minority is a group numerically inferior to the rest of a state’s population, in a non-dominant position, whose members, being nationals of the state, possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity toward preserving their culture, traditions, religion, or language.
- **Genocide:** The 1948 Genocide Convention defines genocide as specified acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such.
- **Discrimination:** Under ICERD, “**racial discrimination**” means any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin that has the purpose or effect of impairing equal enjoyment of human rights in public life.

## **BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

To understand the current crisis, it is essential to examine the deep-rooted historical, legal, and political factors that have marginalized ethnic minorities in Myanmar for decades. These structural dynamics shaped by colonial policies, exclusionary citizenship laws, and military governance have collectively produced a system of discrimination, statelessness, and recurring violence.



### **1. The 1982 Citizenship Law & Statelessness**

One of the most significant legal mechanisms of exclusion in Myanmar is the 1982 Citizenship Law, which institutionalized discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly the Rohingya.

**1.1 The “1823” Requirement:** The law defines “full citizens” as members of ethnic groups that can prove residence in Myanmar prior to 1823, the beginning of the First Anglo-Burmese War. This requirement effectively excludes the Rohingya, whose historical presence is not officially recognized by the state.

**1.2 Tiered Citizenship System:** The law established three categories of citizenship—full, associate, and naturalized—based largely on ancestry rather than birthplace. This system creates a hierarchy of rights, leaving many minorities without full legal protection.

**1.3 Administrative Erasure:** Rohingya individuals were stripped of National Registration Cards and instead issued temporary “white cards,” which did not confer citizenship rights. This process rendered large populations stateless, severely limiting access to education, healthcare, freedom of movement, and legal protection.

The 1982 Citizenship Law was a turning point, specifically designed to distinguish “pure-blooded” nationals from those who entered during the colonial period, such as Bengali Muslims and Indians. This law effectively stripped the Rohingya of their citizenship, setting the stage for decades of “clearance operations,” including major military crackdowns in 1978 and 1991, and culminating in the 2017 genocide that forced nearly one million Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. (“Blocked”)

## **2. Colonial Legacy & “Divide and Rule”**

Many scholars trace Myanmar’s ethnic divisions back to British colonial rule (1824–1948), which reshaped the country’s demographic and political structure.

**2.1 Administrative Separation:** The British divided Myanmar into “Ministerial Burma” (dominated by the Bamar majority) and “Frontier Areas” (inhabited by ethnic minorities). This separation reinforced ethnic divisions and hindered national integration.

**2.2 Encouraged Migration:** The colonial administration facilitated migration from British India, particularly of Bengali Muslims, to meet labor demands. This later fueled narratives portraying certain minority groups, especially the Rohingya, as “foreigners.” (Degterev)

**2.3 World War II Tensions:** During World War II, different ethnic groups aligned with opposing sides—some supporting the British and others the Japanese-backed Burma Independence Army. These divisions deepened mistrust between communities. (Malik)

Under British rule (1824–1948), a "divide and rule" policy separated the "Ministerial Burma" (the Bamar heartland) from the "Frontier Areas" (minority regions), exacerbating cultural and political differences. While the 1947 Panglong Agreement promised full autonomy for frontier areas, the assassination of General Aung San and the subsequent 1962 military coup by General Ne Win led to an isolationist, Bamar-centric state that prioritized national unity over minority rights. (“Understanding the Legacy of British Imperialism on Burma’s Internal Conflicts”)

### **3. Post-Independence Military Operations & Systematic Persecution**

Following independence in 1948, Myanmar experienced ongoing conflict between the central government and ethnic minorities, which intensified under military rule.

**3.1 Operation Nagamin (1977–1978):** Officially a citizenship verification campaign, this operation led to widespread human rights abuses and forced over 200,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.

**3.2 Operation Clean and Beautiful State (1991–1992):** A military crackdown involving forced labor, displacement, and violence resulted in another mass exodus of approximately 250,000 Rohingya.

**3.3 2012 Communal Violence:** Clashes in Rakhine State displaced around 130,000 people, leading to long-term segregation and the establishment of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. (Salehin)

The crisis reached a critical point in 2016–2017, when Myanmar’s military launched so-called “clearance operations” in Rakhine State. These operations involved widespread human rights violations, including killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of villages. Nearly 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh within a short period, creating one of the largest refugee crises in the world. International investigations, including those by the United Nations, identified patterns consistent with crimes against humanity and possible genocidal intent.

### **4. Historical timeline from colonial era to 2026**

Myanmar’s minority-rights crisis has deep roots in colonial-era governance, wartime population movements, post-independence nation-building, and successive military regimes.

In Rakhine, disputes over belonging and ethnicity intensified across the 20th century, with the post-1962 military state increasingly framing Rohingya as “foreign,” dissolving Rohingya political organizations, and using citizenship screening as a coercive tool. Human Rights Watch documents that Operation Nagamin (1977–1978), officially portrayed as a citizenship registration campaign, drove over 200,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh by May 1978 amid serious abuses.


In the early 1990s, another major flight occurred. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports that repression and forced-labour practices triggered an exodus of more than 250,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh in 1991–1992, followed by a long, contested repatriation process in which hundreds of thousands returned under UNHCR-supervised arrangements but often without durable rights guarantees. This historical pattern, mass flight, partial return, continued discrimination, created a protracted displacement ecosystem and normalized “temporary” legal statuses that became generational.

The 2012 communal violence in Rakhine produced a durable system of segregation and encampment. UN reporting and humanitarian monitoring have repeatedly referenced roughly 130,000 Rohingya (and Kaman) remaining displaced in central Rakhine since 2012, living in camps/temporary shelters under extensive movement restrictions.

The 2016–2017 “clearance operations” marked an escalation into mass atrocity. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (IFFM) documented consistent patterns of serious violations, attributing major responsibility to Myanmar security forces, and framed the operations in Rakhine as involving atrocity crimes, including analysis of genocidal intent. By 2018, international analysis widely converged on “nearly 700,000” displaced into Bangladesh within months, cementing the crisis as one of the world’s largest refugee emergencies.

The February 2021 coup abruptly ended Myanmar’s limited democratic opening and drove the country into expanding armed conflict. The UN Security Council explicitly referenced the state of emergency imposed on 1 February 2021 and demanded an end to violence and release of arbitrarily detained prisoners, reflecting international recognition of a systemic governance rupture. The post-coup period also reactivated and transformed conflict in Rakhine: hostilities resumed in late 2023, and UN reporting describes rising civilian harm, displacement, and flight by Rohingya and others across the border.

By early 2026, international legal processes reached major milestones. The ICJ scheduled and held merits hearings in *The Gambia v. Myanmar* (12–29 January 2026), while the ICC Prosecutor had already sought an arrest warrant related to Rohingya deportation/persecution.



The timeline synthesizes core, repeatedly documented milestones across UN and major rights sources, emphasizing events with continued legal and protection relevance. (Abdelkader)

## 5. Legal and political context in Myanmar

Myanmar’s minority-rights crisis is tightly bound to a legal architecture that enables exclusion and a political architecture that concentrates coercive control. Two instruments are especially central.

First, the 1982 Citizenship Law created a tiered citizenship system (commonly summarized as full, associate, and naturalized categories), implemented through documentation requirements and ethnic “national races” frameworks that have been applied to deny or obstruct nationality claims for Rohingya. This has had direct downstream effects on freedom of movement, access to education and healthcare, marriage and livelihoods, and vulnerability to arbitrary detention—because noncitizens or those with precarious documents often cannot pass checkpoints, register births, or access routine services on equal terms.

Second, the 2008 Constitution entrenched the military’s structural role inside the state, including reserved legislative seats and control over core security ministries, making legal reform exceptionally difficult even during periods of civilian-led governance. Analysts and transitional justice organizations have repeatedly emphasized that the constitutional architecture created a built-in veto and autonomy for the military, undermining democratic accountability and civilian control of coercive institutions.

After the 2021 coup, the governing authorities (including the military-led State Administration Council) further eroded rule-of-law conditions; UN reporting describes escalating violence and a humanitarian crisis in which large numbers of civilians require assistance, while airstrikes and attacks on social infrastructure are reported. These conditions

are especially damaging for minorities because discriminatory legal status intersects with conflict exposure—turning “rights” into permissions and making protection dependent on armed actors.

## CURRENT SITUATION

Following the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s crisis has evolved into a multidimensional conflict in which legal exclusion, armed violence, and humanitarian collapse intersect. The military has increasingly weaponized administrative systems, particularly citizenship documentation to justify political control, including voter exclusion and broader power consolidation. At the same time, conditions in Rakhine State have deteriorated into a complex three-way conflict involving the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), the Arakan Army (AA), and Rohingya armed groups.



According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), this conflict has intensified significantly since late 2023, with at least 2,351 recorded conflict-related incidents, including over 550 airstrikes and 330 artillery attacks between November 2023 and August 2025.

These operations have resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and widespread destruction, although the actual figures are likely higher due to underreporting .

The military continues to carry out **indiscriminate airstrikes** against civilian infrastructure, including schools and religious buildings, contributing to mass casualties and long-term psychological trauma. OHCHR documentation further highlights that children are frequently among the victims, reinforcing concerns about violations of international humanitarian law . (“A/HRC/60/20: Situation of



Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - Advance Edited Version”)

### **Escalating Conflict Dynamics & Civilian Impact**

The conflict in Rakhine is no longer limited to state versus minority dynamics but has evolved into overlapping armed confrontations that expose civilians, particularly the Rohingya to continuous risk. The Arakan Army has gained territorial control over most of Rakhine State, while the military continues aerial and artillery assaults. Martial law imposed in July 2025 across large parts of Rakhine has further intensified insecurity. Furthermore OHCHR reports confirm that both the military and the Arakan Army have committed violations with impunity, including killings, arbitrary arrests, and destruction of civilian property. Thereby this environment creates a situation in which civilians are trapped between multiple armed actors, with no reliable protection mechanisms. *(Human Rights Council Sixtieth Session Agenda Item 2 Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights\* Summary)*

### **Systematic Violations Against the Rohingya**

The Rohingya remain one of the most vulnerable populations within Myanmar’s ongoing conflict, facing systematic and targeted abuses from multiple actors. One of the most alarming patterns documented is the widespread practice of forced recruitment. Both the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army have coerced Rohingya men and boys—some as young as fifteen—into joining their forces. Thousands have reportedly been conscripted and deployed to frontline positions, often as expendable combatants, with many remaining unaccounted for or presumed dead.



In addition to forced recruitment, arbitrary detention has become increasingly widespread. Since late 2023, more than 5,000 civilians, including a significant number of Rohingya, have been detained under conditions described by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as inhumane and degrading. Testimonies indicate the use of torture, ill-treatment, and enforced disappearances, with even minors among those affected .

Furthermore, extrajudicial killings continue to be reported. Refugees and witnesses have described incidents in which Rohingya civilians were killed in areas without active hostilities, suggesting that such violence is not incidental but part of a broader pattern of targeted persecution . These abuses are compounded by persistent identity-based discrimination, as both the military and the Arakan Army have denied the Rohingya's identity and reinforced narratives that justify their exclusion and mistreatment.

### **Humanitarian Crisis and Living Conditions**

The humanitarian situation in Rakhine State has reached critical levels, with civilians facing severe deprivation of basic needs. Movement restrictions imposed by armed actors, combined with prolonged blockades, have drastically limited access to food, healthcare, and humanitarian assistance. According to OHCHR-linked reporting, approximately 57 percent of households in central Rakhine are unable to meet their basic food requirements, reflecting a sharp rise in hunger and malnutrition .

In northern Rakhine, conditions are even more dire. Many Rohingya survive on only one meal per day, while outbreaks of diseases such as malaria and acute diarrhoea have become increasingly common due to inadequate sanitation and healthcare access. These challenges are further



exacerbated by communication blackouts and surveillance measures, which restrict the flow of information and make it difficult to assess the full scale of the crisis.

As a result, Rohingya communities continue to live in conditions widely described as “apartheid-like,” where severe restrictions on movement, education, healthcare, and livelihoods systematically undermine their basic human rights and long-term survival.

### **Displacement, Property Seizure, and Demographic Change**

Displacement remains a central feature of the crisis, reflecting both immediate violence and long-term structural exclusion. Since late 2023, more than half of the Rohingya population in Rakhine has been displaced, either internally or across international borders. Approximately



140,000 Rohingya continue to live in long-standing displacement camps in central Rakhine, while tens of thousands more have been forced to flee due to renewed conflict.

OHCHR findings indicate widespread destruction, confiscation, and reallocation of Rohingya-owned property, raising serious concerns

about deliberate efforts to alter the demographic composition of the region. Homes, villages, and religious structures have been destroyed or repurposed, often preventing displaced populations from returning. Even in cases where Rohingya have attempted to return, they frequently find themselves unable to rebuild their homes or reclaim their land, leaving them in a state of prolonged displacement and insecurity.

### **Regional Spillover and Protection Crisis**

The impact of the crisis extends far beyond Myanmar’s borders, creating significant regional challenges. Bangladesh continues to host approximately one million Rohingya refugees, the majority of whom reside in densely populated camps with limited legal protections and restricted access to livelihoods. The absence of formal refugee status under national law further complicates their situation, leaving many in a state of prolonged uncertainty.

Ongoing violence, forced recruitment, and deteriorating conditions in Myanmar have driven over 150,000 Rohingya to flee between 2024 and 2025, according to United Nations reporting. As safe and legal pathways remain limited, many refugees resort to dangerous

migration routes, particularly by sea. These journeys have proven deadly, with hundreds reported to have died while attempting to escape.

These developments reflect a broader regional protection failure, where insufficient legal frameworks, restricted mobility, and declining humanitarian support push vulnerable populations toward life-threatening alternatives, including human trafficking networks.

### **Conclusion of the Current Situation**

The findings of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights demonstrate that the situation in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine State, constitutes not merely a humanitarian crisis but a systematic human rights emergency. The convergence of ongoing armed conflict, institutionalized discrimination, and widespread abuses—including forced recruitment, arbitrary detention, and killings—has created conditions of severe humanitarian deprivation and mass displacement.

Crucially, the underlying causes of the crisis, including the denial of citizenship, legal exclusion, and entrenched impunity, remain unresolved. As long as these structural issues persist, the cycle of violence, displacement, and marginalization affecting the Rohingya and other minority groups is likely to continue.

### **Key quantitative indicators**

The following tables consolidate the most policy-relevant operational numbers available from major humanitarian sources. These figures are not “census-accurate”: definitions, coverage, and update dates differ. Where sources diverge, the range is presented and the discrepancy is flagged.

Myanmar displacement across borders (UNHCR, updated 31 Jan 2026).

| Host country | Myanmar refugees & asylum-seekers | Share of total |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| Bangladesh   | 1,182,800                         | 73.8%          |
| Malaysia     | 194,100                           | 12.1%          |
| Thailand     | 136,300                           | 8.5%           |
| India        | 86,000                            | 5.4%           |
| Indonesia    | 2,700                             | 0.2%           |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>1,601,900</b>                  | <b>100%</b>    |

## **MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED**

The protection of minority rights in the Rohingya crisis involves a complex, multi-layered effort from international organizations, states, and non-governmental entities. Key parties involved in advocating for, protecting, and delivering aid to the Rohingya population include the United Nations (UN), international legal bodies, NGOs, and specific host countries.

### **1. United Nations Agencies (UN)**

The UN plays the central role in the humanitarian response and protection of Rohingya rights in Bangladesh and Myanmar. (“61 NGOs Call for Action to Ensure the Rights, Security and Dignity of Rohingya Refugees”)



- **UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency):** Leads the protection response, provides emergency relief, registers refugees, and offers legal assistance.
- **IOM (International Organization for Migration):** Works with UNHCR to provide emergency shelter, water, and sanitation to over 1 million refugees.
- **UNICEF:** Focuses on child protection, education, and health services for children in camps.
- **UNFPA (UN Population Fund):** Provides reproductive health services and safe spaces for women and girls.
- **UN Women:** Works on empowering women through Community Outreach Volunteers to prevent gender-based violence (GBV).
- **OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights):** Monitors and reports on human rights violations. (Duran et al.) (UNHCR, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained”)

### **2. Legal Bodies and International Accountability**

- **The Gambia:** Instituted proceedings against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2019, accusing Myanmar of breaching the Genocide Convention.
- **International Court of Justice (ICJ):** Ordered provisional measures requiring Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts against the Rohingya.

- **International Criminal Court (ICC):** Authorized investigations into crimes committed against the Rohingya, focusing on those crossing into Bangladesh.
- **Argentinian Courts:** A "universal jurisdiction" case was filed by the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) to hold Myanmar leaders accountable for genocide.

(“International Responses to the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: From Political Inaction to Growing Legal Pressure - FIIA - Finnish Institute of International Affairs”)

### 3. Key Governments and Regional Bodies

- **Bangladesh:** Hosts over 1 million Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, providing primary refuge, although it faces immense pressure on its infrastructure.
- **Malaysia & Indonesia:** Key regional actors that have permitted the disembarkation of Rohingya refugee boats and provided humanitarian assistance.
- **USA, Canada, EU:** Have sanctioned Myanmar military officials for human rights violations and provided financial aid.
- **ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations):** Developed a Five-Point Consensus to address the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, although its effectiveness in protecting the Rohingya has been criticized due to non-interference policies. (“UN: Support Protection, Justice for Rohingya”)

### 4. NGOs and Advocacy Organizations

- **Rohingya-led Organizations:** Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK), Free Rohingya Coalition, and Rohingya Human Rights Initiative advocate directly for justice.
- **International Human Rights Groups:** Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Fortify Rights document atrocities, pressure Myanmar’s government, and call for accountability.
- **Humanitarian NGOs:** Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Save the Children, International Rescue Committee (IRC), and Islamic Relief provide specialized services, including education, GBV prevention, and legal assistance. (“90+

Organizations Urge a Rohingya Crimes against Humanity and Genocide Determination - Refugees International”)

## 5. Independent Bodies

- **UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (IIFMM):** Documented patterns of genocide and human rights violations.

These parties often work under a Joint Response Plan (JRP) to coordinate protection services, ensuring that the rights and dignity of the Rohingya are prioritized amidst ongoing security risks and limited funding. (United Nations) (<https://www.rohingya.org> and <https://www.rohingya.org>, “Our Members - Rohingya Human Rights Initiative”)

## RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

### 1. International Judicial Proceedings (ICJ and ICC)

- **The Gambia v. Myanmar (ICJ - 2019-2026):** Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
- **Provisional Measures Order (January 23, 2020):** A legally binding order requiring Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts against the Rohingya, preserve evidence of crimes, and report regularly on compliance.
- **Preliminary Objections Ruling (July 2022):** The ICJ rejected Myanmar’s objections, confirming The Gambia’s standing and the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.
- **International Criminal Court (ICC) Investigation:** In November 2019, the ICC authorized an investigation into crimes against humanity (deportation, persecution) because part of the criminal conduct occurred on Bangladeshi territory, an ICC member state.
- **Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM):** Established by the Human Rights Council in 2018 (Resolution 39/2) to collect and preserve evidence of serious international crimes committed since 2011 to facilitate future prosecutions.

(“Q&A: The Gambia v. Myanmar, Rohingya Genocide at the International Court of Justice, May 2020 Factsheet”)

## 2. UN General Assembly Resolutions

The UN General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions addressing the "Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar". (“Document Viewer”)

- **A/RES/79/182 (December 17, 2024):** Condemns violations against Rohingya, demands a voluntary, safe, and dignified return, and calls for an end to forced recruitment.
- **Previous annual resolutions (2017-2023):** Such as 78/219 (2023), 77/227 (2022), and 76/180 (2021), which reiterate the need to address root causes, including the denial of citizenship.

## 3. Human Rights Council Documents

- **Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (2018):** Found that military operations in 2017 amounted to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. (Human Rights Council)
- **Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar (HRC Resolutions):** Frequent resolutions (e.g., 56/1, 55/20, 53/26) that track the implementation of FFM recommendations. (“A/HRC/60/20: Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights - Advance Edited Version”)

## 4. International Treaties and Conventions

These foundational instruments define the rights of the Rohingya and the obligations of Myanmar:

- **Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948):** Myanmar is a party (ratified 1956).
- **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):** Article 15 recognizes the right to a nationality, violated by the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law. (Zampolli)

- **Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW):** Both ratified by Myanmar, used to hold the state accountable for the treatment of Rohingya women and children.
- **1951 Refugee Convention:** While not a signatory, the principle of *non-refoulement* is recognized as customary international law, binding on host countries (e.g., Bangladesh).

## 5. Other Relevant Documents

- **ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (2021):** Cited in Security Council resolution 2669 (2022), it demands an immediate end to violence and humanitarian access.
- **Bilateral Return Arrangement (2017):** A memorandum between Bangladesh and Myanmar for repatriation, which the UN maintains must adhere to international standards of being safe, voluntary, and dignified.

## SOLUTION ALTERNATIVES

Protecting the minority rights of the Rohingya involves a combination of immediate humanitarian intervention, long-term legal and political reforms within Myanmar, and regional responsibility-sharing. Durable solutions are anchored in ensuring the safety, citizenship, and dignity of the Rohingya, with accountability for past atrocities being a crucial element.

### 1. Legal and Political Reforms in Myanmar

A central pillar of any sustainable solution is reforming Myanmar’s legal and political framework, which currently enables systemic discrimination.

The 1982 Citizenship Law remains the primary mechanism of exclusion and must be amended or repealed to align



with international human rights standards. Removing ethnicity-based requirements and introducing transparent, non-discriminatory citizenship procedures would address the root cause of Rohingya statelessness. (“Durable Solutions to the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar”)

In parallel, broader constitutional and governance reforms are necessary. Establishing a system that recognizes all ethnic groups equally and limits military control is essential for preventing future abuses. Proposals such as the Federal Democracy Charter advocate for decentralization and equal representation, ensuring that minority groups have a meaningful role in governance. (Diplomatic Council)

Ending impunity is equally critical. Continued international support for cases at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and investigations by the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as the use of universal jurisdiction, are necessary to hold perpetrators accountable and deter future violations.

## **2. Immediate Protection and Empowerment in Refugee Contexts**

While long-term solutions are pursued, immediate protection measures must focus on Rohingya populations living in displacement, particularly in Bangladesh.

Improving living conditions in refugee camps is a priority. Expanding access to education and livelihood opportunities can reduce dependency on aid and mitigate risks such as trafficking and exploitation. Strengthening camp security is also essential to protect vulnerable groups, especially women and children, from violence and criminal networks. (Sullivan)

Equally important is the empowerment and participation of Rohingya communities. Including refugee representatives, civil society actors, and women leaders in decision-making processes, particularly regarding repatriation, ensures that solutions are inclusive and responsive to actual needs (Refugees International). (“Long-Term



Solutions for the Rohingya Response - Bangladesh | ReliefWeb”) These measures not only

improve immediate protection but also prepare displaced populations for eventual reintegration or resettlement.

### **3. International and Regional Responsibility-Sharing**

The scale of the crisis requires coordinated international action and shared responsibility.

Repatriation must be safe, voluntary, and dignified, and should only occur when verifiable conditions in Myanmar guarantee security, freedom of movement, and access to basic rights. Premature returns risk perpetuating cycles of displacement and abuse.

At the same time, expanding third-country resettlement programs, particularly for the most vulnerable individuals, can provide durable solutions where return is not feasible. Pathways such as education visas, humanitarian admissions, and family reunification should be strengthened.

The international community should also apply targeted pressure on the Myanmar military, including sanctions on financial resources, arms embargoes, and restrictions on aviation fuel, to reduce its capacity to conduct attacks against civilians. Regional actors such as ASEAN, India, and China must play a more active role in diplomatic engagement and conflict resolution efforts. (“General Assembly Urges Protection, Justice, Lasting Solutions for Rohingya as Crisis Deepens | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases”)

(“Rohingya Crisis in Bangladesh and How to Solve It - International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science”)

### **4. Humanitarian Access and Civilian Protection**

Establishing humanitarian corridors and cross-border aid mechanisms can allow life-saving



assistance to reach affected populations, particularly in areas where access is blocked by the military. Collaboration with local humanitarian actors and community networks is

critical in conflict-sensitive environments.

In addition, strengthening civilian protection mechanisms, including monitoring, reporting, and early warning systems, can help reduce the impact of violence on minority populations. (*Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar: Update Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*)

## **5. Long-Term Structural Solutions**

Ultimately, the protection of minority rights depends on addressing the structural causes of the crisis.

A transition toward a federal democratic system is widely seen as necessary to ensure equality, autonomy, and representation for ethnic minorities. However, such a system must include safeguards to prevent discrimination at both national and local levels.

Long-term solutions must also include transitional justice and institutional reform. Supporting international legal processes, preserving evidence, and addressing past violations are essential for breaking cycles of impunity.

Finally, efforts toward social cohesion and reconstruction, including inclusive education, anti-discrimination policies, and community reconciliation—are necessary to address deep-rooted ethnic divisions and prevent future conflict (OHCHR; ).

## **USEFUL LINKS**

- **Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM):** <https://iimm.un.org/>
- **OHCHR Myanmar Reports:** <https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/myanmar>
- **UNHCR Rohingya Response:** <https://reporting.unhcr.org/rohingya-situation>
- **Situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar:** <https://bangkok.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025-09/crp-ny-hi-gh-level-conference-myanmar.pdf>

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