



FORUM: Disarmament and International Security (DISEC)

AGENDA: Addressing the Implications of Autonomous Drone Strikes in Conflict Zones for International Security

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Esteemed Delegates and Honorable Advisors,

It is my utmost honor and immense pleasure to welcome every single one of you to TTMUN'26.

Ever since its first session in 2015, TTMUN Conferences have been an undeniable portrayal of unity, collaboration, and resilience by the fellow members of the TTMUN Club. As the executive team of TTMUN'26, we have dedicated countless hours to organize the 11th annual session of TTMUN; while doing so, we have maintained the same passion and dedication with every step we have taken to sustain the quality of TTMUN. That being said, as the Secretary-General of TTMUN'26, I would like to thank my fellow executive team members and our remarkable advisor, Vesile Acar, whose support made it possible to organize this conference and host you here at our school on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of April. Yet, beyond its tradition, TTMUN'26 is shaped by its purpose.

Our mission in TTMUN Club is to foster mutual growth in a collaborative environment where we are not only discussing real-world issues but also work towards solutions. Therefore, in correlation with our mission, we have chosen the theme of TTMUN'26 to be "Bridging Divides in Human Rights". The significance of the theme lies in the unfortunate irony of the persistence of human rights violations. Today, our world is witnessing and turning a blind eye to human rights violations that the United Nations was initially established to ensure that the world would never witness and do so again. Acknowledging this, we, the youth shall not only wait for our turn to come tomorrow but shape it today. Hence, as the executive team, we hope for a fruitful conference where everyone, regardless of their role, contributes to the debates, lobbying, and discussions, bearing the urgency of our global reality in mind.

As we embark on this journey, this mission will be in action over the course of three days as the delegates will have the opportunity to be active in one of nine committees of TTMUN'26 with fifteen diverse agenda items that seek to solve the serious issues that our world is facing. While doing so, let's embrace the unparalleled value of collaboration, respect, and empathy for a better future. Finally, I hope that you have an incomparable MUN experience and once again as the Secretary General, I wholeheartedly welcome everyone to the TTMUN'26.

“All my hope is in youth!”

—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Yours sincerely,

Derin Halatçı - Secretary General

INTRODUCTION



Recent developments in military technology have transformed the nature of warfare, particularly through the increasing use of drones and autonomous functions in weapons systems (Alberstadt). In modern conflict zones, drones are no longer limited to surveillance; they are now used for targeted strikes, intelligence gathering, border monitoring, and coordinated battlefield operations. At the same

time, the growing integration of artificial intelligence and autonomous decision-making into such systems has generated urgent debate over legality, accountability, ethics, and strategic stability. The United Nations Institution for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) notes that drones have rapidly proliferated and are playing an increasingly important role in conflict zones, which makes their regulation a pressing international security issue.

This issue is especially relevant to the Disarmament & International Security Committee (DISEC) because autonomous drone strikes raise questions that lie at the heart of international peace and security: compliance with international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, the risk of escalation between States, and the possibility that machines may be used to apply force with reduced or insufficient human control. Discussions in the United Nations (UN) system have increasingly focused on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Alarmed by this the Secretary-General has reiterated his call for States to conclude a legally binding instrument on such systems by 2026.

Delegates should therefore examine not only the military advantages these systems offer, but also the dangers they pose to civilians, sovereignty, accountability, and long-term international stability.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Autonomous weapon systems (AWS): Weapon systems that, once activated, can select and apply force to targets with varying degrees of human intervention. The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) describes autonomous weapon systems as systems that select and apply force to targets without human intervention after activation.

Autonomous drone strikes: Strikes carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles that rely partly or fully on autonomous functions such as target identification, tracking, or attack execution.

Meaningful human control: A principle often used in international discussions to refer to the requirement that humans retain sufficient judgment and oversight over the use of force, especially over target selection and attack decisions. This is a central concern in current UN and ICRC debates on autonomous weapons.

International humanitarian law (IHL): The body of law regulating conduct during armed conflict, including the principles of distinction, proportionality, necessity, and precaution.

Distinction: The obligation to distinguish at all times between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives.

Proportionality: The rule prohibiting attacks in which expected civilian harm would be excessive compared with the anticipated military advantage.

Accountability: The ability to determine who is legally and politically responsible for unlawful harm caused by an attack, including commanders, operators, programmers, manufacturers, or States.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: The rule that Member States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

Article 51 of the UN Charter: Recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member State.

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): A subset of AWS designed specifically to apply lethal force without direct human intervention once activated.

Human-in-the-loop: Systems requiring human authorization before each strike.

Human-on-the-loop: Systems supervised by humans who can intervene but do not make every decision.

Human-out-of-the-loop: Fully autonomous systems with no human input after activation.

Target recognition algorithms: AI systems used to identify targets based on data patterns such as visuals or behavior.

Machine learning (ML): AI systems that improve performance through data analysis rather than explicit programming.

Deep learning: A subset of ML using neural networks to process complex data such as images or video feeds.

Neural networks: Computational models inspired by the human brain used in AI decision-making processes.

Algorithmic bias: Errors caused by biased training data, potentially leading to wrongful targeting.

False positive (in targeting): Incorrect identification of a civilian or object as a legitimate military target.

Civilian casualties (collateral damage): Harm or death inflicted on civilians during military operations.

Targeted killing: The deliberate killing of a specific individual outside immediate combat.

Loitering munitions: Drones that hover before striking targets, often autonomously.

Kamikaze drones: Another term for loitering munitions designed for self-destruction upon impact.

Drone swarm autonomy: The ability of drone swarms to make collective decisions without human control.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): Aircraft operated without a human pilot onboard.

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV): Armed UAVs specifically designed for combat operations.

Dual-use technology: Technology usable for both civilian and military purposes.

Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones: Readily available drones adapted for military use.

Weaponization of AI: The integration of artificial intelligence into military systems.

Autonomy threshold: The level at which a system is considered “autonomous” rather than automated.

Automation vs autonomy: Automation follows preset rules; autonomy involves decision-making without human input.

ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance): Information-gathering activities supporting military operations.

Persistent surveillance: Continuous monitoring of a target or area over time.

Pattern-of-life analysis: Studying daily behaviors to identify targets.

Rules of Engagement (ROE): Guidelines determining when and how force can be used.

Use of force: Deployment of military power regulated under international law.

Sovereignty: A state's authority over its territory without external interference.

Violation of sovereignty: Unauthorized use of force within another state's territory.

Protected persons: Individuals protected under IHL, including civilians and medical personnel.

Proliferation: Spread of drone and autonomous weapon technologies globally.

Arms race (AI arms race): Competition among states to develop advanced military AI.

Non-state actors: Groups such as terrorist organizations operating outside state control.

Hybrid warfare: Combination of conventional, irregular, and cyber warfare methods.

Remote warfare: Conducting conflict from a distance using technology.

State responsibility: A state's accountability for internationally wrongful acts.

Cyber vulnerability: Risk of hacking or manipulation of autonomous systems.

Electronic warfare: Disrupting enemy systems through electronic means.

GPS spoofing: Manipulating navigation systems to mislead drones.

Data poisoning: Corrupting AI training data to alter system behavior.

Fail-safe mechanisms: Built-in systems to prevent unintended harm.

Ethical autonomy: Debate over whether machines can make moral decisions.

Martens Clause: A principle stating that civilians and combatants remain under protection of international law even when specific rules are absent.

Precautionary principle in AI: The idea that lack of full certainty should not delay measures to prevent harm.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The rapid development and deployment of autonomous drone technology has transformed modern warfare, introducing both strategic advantages and significant legal, ethical, and security challenges. Autonomous drone strikes are carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that can rely partially or fully on artificial intelligence (AI) to identify, track, and

engage targets. Unlike traditional drone operations, which are controlled directly by human operators, these systems can make lethal decisions with varying levels of human oversight, raising questions about compliance with international law, accountability, and ethical standards.



Autonomous weapon systems (AWS), including loitering munitions, kamikaze drones, and AI-enabled strike platforms, have been increasingly integrated into the arsenals of major powers such as the United States, China, Russia, Israel, and Turkey. The U.S. has employed semi-autonomous drones in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, often relying on signature strikes and advanced targeting algorithms. Russia and Iran have deployed autonomous or semi-autonomous systems in Ukraine and the Middle East, while Turkey has successfully exported Bayraktar TB2 drones that have been used in conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh. Israel has utilized autonomous capabilities extensively in Gaza for targeted operations, and China is rapidly advancing AI-enabled drones for surveillance, swarm attacks, and export to other states. Non-state actors, including ISIS, Hezbollah, and other militant groups, have also adapted commercially available drones for reconnaissance and improvised attacks, demonstrating the growing accessibility and strategic impact of autonomous systems.

Despite their increasing use, there is currently no dedicated, binding international treaty specifically regulating autonomous drones or lethal autonomous weapons systems. Instead, these technologies are addressed under existing frameworks, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law (IHL), and weapons review obligations under Additional Protocol I, Article 36, which requires States to assess whether new weapons comply with international law. Informal discussions occur within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, but states remain divided on whether to pursue a legally binding treaty, non-binding guidelines, or voluntary national review processes. Major powers like the U.S., Russia, China, and Israel favor non-binding frameworks that allow continued development, while states such as Austria, Chile, and Mexico advocate for a preemptive ban on fully autonomous lethal systems.

The implications of autonomous drone strikes are multifaceted. They pose significant risks to civilian populations due to potential failures in distinction and proportionality, especially in urban combat zones. They create an accountability gap, as determining responsibility for unlawful attacks becomes increasingly complex when AI systems operate without direct human oversight. Autonomous systems also raise sovereignty concerns, particularly when strikes cross borders without consent, and can contribute to strategic instability by lowering

the threshold for the use of force and increasing the likelihood of proliferation among non-state actors. Ethical debates emphasize that decisions over human life should not be delegated to machines, reflecting broader concerns about moral responsibility and the human cost of remote warfare.

Given these challenges, the international community faces pressing questions regarding the legality, regulation, and ethical deployment of autonomous drone strikes. The debate involves balancing the operational advantages of autonomy with the need to protect civilians, uphold international law, maintain global stability, and ensure accountability. As autonomous systems become more sophisticated, their integration into modern conflict zones highlights the urgency of establishing clear norms, guidelines, and potential treaty frameworks to mitigate risks and prevent unintended escalation.

General Overview

Drone warfare has expanded rapidly over the last two decades (Davison). What began primarily as the use of remotely piloted aircraft for surveillance and precision strikes has evolved into the deployment of increasingly advanced systems with autonomous capabilities. Today, armed drones are used by both States and non-State armed groups, while autonomy is being integrated into navigation, loitering, target recognition, and strike functions. UNIDIR has highlighted both the growing proliferation of drones and the rising use of uncrewed aerial systems by non-State armed groups, including in Africa and Myanmar (The Trevor Project).

The military appeal of these systems is clear. They can reduce risks to military personnel, remain in the air for long periods, gather real-time intelligence, and strike quickly. However, their increasing autonomy creates serious legal and strategic concerns. In conflict zones, autonomous functions may increase the speed of engagement beyond meaningful human judgment, making it harder to ensure compliance with IHL. The ICRC has warned that autonomous weapon systems raise challenges under the rules governing means and methods of warfare and the conduct of hostilities.

Another major concern is escalation. Drone strikes can lower the political and operational threshold for the use of force, especially across borders or outside traditional battlefields. UNIDIR has warned that armed UAV operations can intensify tensions, including through misidentification, unintended strikes, and “friendly fire” incidents.

Moreover, accountability becomes blurred when machines contribute to life-and-death decisions. If an autonomous drone strike unlawfully kills civilians, it may be difficult to determine whether responsibility lies with the operator, the commander, the software developer, the manufacturer, or the State itself. This accountability gap is one of the central reasons why many States and organizations have called for international regulation.

Major Problems Raised by Autonomous Drone Strikes

Civilian Harm and Compliance with IHL

Autonomous functions, while increasingly sophisticated, often struggle to accurately interpret complex and dynamic real-world environments. In urban warfare, for example, civilians and combatants may be intermingled, and civilian objects may be located near legitimate military targets. Autonomous systems may misidentify individuals, fail to account for changing situations, or miscalculate the potential effects of an attack, creating significant risks for the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law (IHL). High-profile incidents, such as the 2021 drone strike in Kabul, Afghanistan, which mistakenly killed civilians, illustrate the practical challenges in ensuring autonomous systems can reliably adhere to IHL. These risks are amplified in conflict zones with limited real-time intelligence or incomplete data, raising questions about whether autonomous weapons can ever operate with sufficient compliance to legal and humanitarian standards.

Accountability Gap

As autonomy increases, human operators and commanders may be physically and temporally removed from the moment force is applied. This separation complicates the attribution of legal responsibility for unlawful harm, creating what is often referred to as an accountability gap. If a fully autonomous system erroneously targets civilians, it can be difficult to determine whether liability rests with the manufacturer, the programmer, the operator, or the state deploying the system. The ambiguity weakens deterrence against unlawful attacks and challenges core concepts of justice and accountability under both domestic law and international law, potentially undermining norms designed to prevent impunity in armed conflict.

Violation of Sovereignty

Cross-border drone strikes, particularly those conducted without the consent of the host State or outside recognized battlefields, may constitute violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (UNODA). While some States justify such operations under self-defense (Article 51) or with Security Council authorization, the lack of a clear legal framework for autonomous operations leaves significant room for dispute. Persistent unauthorized strikes can erode trust between states, strain diplomatic relations, and increase the likelihood of retaliatory action, raising both legal and geopolitical concerns.

Escalation and Strategic Instability

Autonomous drone systems are relatively inexpensive, highly mobile, and low-risk for operators, which lowers the threshold for the use of force. This accessibility increases the


probability that states may resort to military action more frequently, potentially contributing to escalation in tense regional situations. Moreover, the rapid proliferation of drone technology raises the likelihood that non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations or militias, may acquire autonomous or semi-autonomous systems. The spread of these capabilities could destabilize fragile regions, challenge state monopoly over force, and undermine traditional concepts of strategic deterrence.

Ethical Concerns

Beyond legal and strategic challenges, autonomous drone strikes raise profound ethical questions. Many states, scholars, and civil society organizations argue that decisions over life and death should never be delegated to machines, as machines lack moral reasoning, empathy, and accountability. The ethical debate centers on whether it is acceptable for AI to make instantaneous lethal decisions, particularly in situations with high civilian risk. These concerns have become central in UN discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems, with campaigns such as “Stop Killer Robots” advocating for meaningful human control and, in some cases, preemptive bans on fully autonomous systems. The ethical dimensions underscore the broader tension between military innovation and the humanitarian imperative to protect human life


MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED

United States



The United States is one of the most influential actors in the development and use of drone warfare. It has extensively deployed drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper in counterterrorism operations across regions like Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan. While these operations are often justified as precise and low-risk for military personnel, they have raised serious

concerns regarding civilian casualties, accountability, and violations of state sovereignty. The U.S. is also investing heavily in increasing the autonomy of its unmanned systems, placing it at the center of debates on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).



China

China is rapidly advancing in artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons technology, including armed drones. It has become a major exporter of drone systems to

countries in Africa and the Middle East, often without the same restrictions seen in Western arms sales. China generally supports continued development under state control but resists strict international bans, emphasizing national sovereignty and technological progress.

Russia



Russia's use of drones has expanded significantly, particularly during the Ukraine war. It has deployed Orlan-10 drones for reconnaissance and Iranian-made Shahed-136 loitering munitions for long-range strikes. These drones often target infrastructure, including energy facilities, raising concerns about violations of international humanitarian law. Russia has prioritized electronic warfare and

autonomy integration, aiming to reduce reliance on human operators. It generally opposes strict international regulations, viewing autonomous weapons as a strategic equalizer against NATO.

Israel



Israel has been at the forefront of drone development since the 1980s and uses systems such as the Heron and Hermes drones for both surveillance and targeted strikes. Its operations in Gaza include precision strikes against suspected militant targets, often in densely populated urban areas. Israel argues that its drones allow for real-time intelligence and reduced collateral damage; however, investigations by human rights organizations have documented civilian casualties

and questioned the proportionality of certain strikes. Israel is also a major exporter, supplying drone technology globally.


Afghanistan



Afghanistan was a central hub for U.S. drone operations targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. (Salt) Drone strikes were often conducted in remote regions with limited oversight, leading to disputed casualty figures. Civilian deaths, including those from

misidentified targets, have contributed to local resentment and have been cited as a factor in prolonging conflict. Afghanistan represents a key case study in the long-term political and social consequences of sustained drone warfare.

Pakistan



Pakistan’s tribal regions experienced hundreds of U.S. drone strikes between 2004 and 2018. While some Pakistani officials privately supported these operations, publicly they condemned them as violations of sovereignty. Reports indicate that “double tap” strikes—where a second strike targets rescuers—caused additional civilian harm and fear among local populations. The situation

illustrates the tension between counterterrorism objectives and international legal norms.

Türkiye



Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 drones, produced by Baykar, have gained international attention for their effectiveness in conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh (2020), where they were used by Azerbaijan to destroy Armenian armored units and air defenses. Turkey has also used drones extensively in northern Syria against Kurdish groups and in Libya to support the Government of National Accord. These drones are relatively low-cost but highly

effective, increasing accessibility of advanced drone warfare capabilities. Turkey actively promotes its drone exports as part of its geopolitical strategy (PÉRIA-PEIGNÉ).

Yemen



In Yemen, U.S. drone strikes have targeted Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), often in coordination with local partners. However, the lack of transparency regarding targeting decisions and casualty assessments has raised concerns. Drone strikes have occurred alongside a broader civil war,

compounding humanitarian crises and complicating attribution of responsibility for civilian harm.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)



The ICRC supports new legally binding rules to prohibit unpredictable autonomous weapon systems and systems designed to target humans, while restricting others to ensure compliance with IHL and civilian protection.

Militarily Advanced States

Some technologically advanced States prefer a more cautious or incremental approach, emphasizing that existing international law already applies and that discussions should focus on responsible use, good practices, and national weapons reviews rather than sweeping bans. This position has also been reflected in ongoing CCW discussions.

Non-State Armed Groups

Non-State actors are increasingly using uncrewed aerial systems in conflicts, which complicates enforcement and increases the threat to regional security. UNIDIR has documented this trend in multiple regions.

Non-state actors have adapted commercially available drones for military purposes. ISIS, for example, modified small drones to drop explosives in Iraq and Syria, while also using them for reconnaissance and propaganda. Hezbollah has developed more advanced drone capabilities, including cross-border surveillance flights. The use of drones by these groups demonstrates how accessible technology can shift power dynamics and complicate traditional military superiority.

Timeline of Events

1945 – The UN Charter is adopted, establishing the rules on the use of force, including Article 2(4) and Article 51. (UN)

2013–2018 – International concern rises over the expansion of armed UAV use and targeted strikes beyond traditional battlefields; UNIDIR publishes work on the expanding development, transfer, and use of armed UAVs. (UN)

2015 onward – The ICRC increasingly urges States to adopt internationally agreed limits on autonomous weapon systems.(UN)

2023 – The UN Secretary-General’s *New Agenda for Peace* reiterates the call for a legally binding instrument on lethal autonomous weapons systems by 2026. (UN)

31 October 2023 – The UN First Committee approves a draft resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems, marking a major step in General Assembly engagement with the issue.(UN)

2024 – The CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS continues formal discussions in Geneva, including sessions in March and August 2024.(UN)

2025 – UN reporting and General Assembly documentation continue to highlight the urgency of addressing autonomous weapons and their humanitarian, legal, ethical, and security implications. (UN)

UN Involvement

The United Nations has addressed this issue through several channels. The First Committee, which deals with disarmament and international security, has formally taken up lethal autonomous weapons systems as a General Assembly issue. In 2023, it approved a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to seek Member State views and compile substantive input on the matter.

In parallel, discussions have continued under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), specifically through the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. These meetings have become the main multilateral forum for discussing possible norms, restrictions, and regulatory frameworks.

The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs has also emphasized the urgency of the matter and referenced the Secretary-General’s 2026 deadline for concluding a legally binding instrument.

Treaties and Frameworks

Unlike landmines, chemical weapons, or cluster munitions, there is currently no dedicated, binding international treaty that specifically regulates autonomous drone strikes or lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) as a category. Instead, the legality and use of such

systems are addressed through a patchwork of existing legal frameworks. These include the UN Charter, which restricts the use of force under Article 2(4) and recognizes the right to self-defense under Article 51; international humanitarian law (IHL), which sets obligations for distinction, proportionality, necessity, and precaution in armed conflict; and weapons review obligations under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which require States party to assess whether new weapons are compliant with IHL before their deployment. Despite these frameworks, autonomous systems present novel legal and ethical challenges, particularly regarding accountability for civilian harm, the delegation of lethal decision-making to machines, and the “meaningful human control” principle emphasized by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Current international discussions are largely taking place in informal and semi-formal forums, such as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, which brings together States, civil society, and technical experts to debate the regulation or potential ban of fully autonomous systems. Some states, including Austria, Chile, and Mexico, have called for a preemptive global ban on fully autonomous lethal weapons, arguing that machines should never make life-and-death decisions. Other major powers, such as the United States, Russia, China, and Israel, have resisted binding restrictions, emphasizing the potential strategic and defensive benefits of autonomous systems and advocating for non-binding guidelines or continued voluntary compliance with IHL.

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS

1. United Nations Charter, 1945. Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>
2. International Humanitarian Law (IHL), overview provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/what-we-do/international-humanitarian-law>
3. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 1977 (Article 36 – Weapons Review). Available at: <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977>
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5. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Available at: <https://disarmament.unoda.org/en/our-work/conventional-arms/convention-certain-conventional-weapons>
6. CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS, reports and meeting documents. Available at: <https://meetings.unoda.org/ccw/convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons-group-of-governmental-experts-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-2025>

Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue

Previous attempts have primarily taken the form of dialogue, norm-building, and expert discussions rather than binding regulation. The CCW process has succeeded in keeping the issue on the international agenda and in clarifying key concerns, but it has been criticized for moving slowly and failing to produce binding outcomes.

Similarly, General Assembly action has expanded political attention to the issue, particularly through the First Committee's 2023 resolution. (Davison) Yet the international community still lacks agreed legal definitions, enforcement mechanisms, and compliance standards.

As a result, previous efforts have been valuable in raising awareness and structuring debate, but insufficient in producing concrete safeguards against unlawful or destabilizing autonomous drone strikes.

SOLUTION ALTERNATIVES

A strong resolution in DISEC could consider the following:

1. Establishing an international legal framework

States could support negotiations for a legally binding instrument that prohibits autonomous systems operating without meaningful human control and restricts other systems through clear rules.

2. Defining meaningful human control

Delegates may work toward a shared definition requiring human oversight in target selection and strike authorization.

3. Strengthening weapons reviews

States should be encouraged to conduct rigorous legal reviews of autonomous and AI-enabled weapons before deployment.

4. Enhancing transparency and reporting

Member States could be asked to report on national doctrine, safeguards, testing standards, and accountability measures related to autonomous drones.

USEFUL LINKS

- United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs – Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (UNODA LAWS page)

<https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/automated/>

- UN Meetings Coverage – “First Committee Approves New Resolution on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” (31 October 2023)

<https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3731.doc.htm>

- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research – Missiles and Drones (focus area)

<https://unidir.org/focus-area/missiles-drones/>

- UNIDIR – “Armed and dangerous? A brief overview of uncrewed aerial systems – risks, impacts and avenues for action” (2024)

https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/armed_and_dangerous_web.pdf

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